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Abstract
We show that information frictions can explain financial contagion without correlated fundamentals
and explain why emerging markets are more susceptible to contagion. Costly information may cause
investors to group country signals, because such imprecise signals are cheaper. These joint signals then
cause asset prices to comove, which can be observed as contagion. Due to lower demand for country-
specific information and lower risk weighted returns, it is likelier that investors group signals of emerging
markets, thereby making them more prone to contagion. We find empirical evidence for our predictions
using a novel data set on the number of joint news articles and exploit exogenous variation in news due
to terrorism.
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1 Introduction
A feature of crises in emerging markets is that they often spill over and contagion is a real concern. Ac-
cording to Calvo and Mendoza (2000b), the spread of Thailand’s financial crisis across East Asia in 1997
and the global financial disturbance following Russia’s default in 1998 are broadly attributed to contagion
effects through global financial markets. As Eichengreen et al. (1996) point out, a frequently cited reason
for the assistance provided to Mexico in 1995 was that the Mexican crisis, if not stopped, would have serious
effects in other emerging markets.
The topic of contagion has emerged with the Asian crisis1 of the late 1990s. In addition to spreading
throughout East Asia, the crisis went on to hit other emerging economies, particularly in Latin America
in 1998. The fact that a regional phenomenon spread out so severely across the globe induced the need
for further understanding of contagion. Interestingly, contagion is mostly a concern for emerging markets,
around which much of the literature has revolved. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009, p. 243-244) list cases of
bunched banking crises. They find that, with the exception of the Great Recession starting in 2007, there
have been five global contagion episodes since World War II. All of these involved emerging markets or
low income countries, with advanced economies having only been involved once. As Hutchison and Noy
(2006) argue, emerging markets are different in regards to crisis susceptibility. Claessens (2005) also notes
that it is mainly middle-income countries, i.e. emerging markets, that are exposed to financial contagion. It
is especially surprising that contagion can happen among countries with seemingly uncorrelated, or at least
imperfectly correlated fundamentals. We therefore view this puzzle as a matter of excess correlation among
countries and link this to information frictions on the side of investors2.
We show that information frictions play a role in explaining contagion with independent fundamentals
and explain why emerging markets are more susceptible to contagion. Our paper has three main novelties.
First, we consider both theoretically and empirically the type of information an agent receives, rather than
just the amount. More specifically, we develop a model to analyze the effects of observing grouped signals,
which are common to many countries vs. country-specific signals. Second, we find evidence that costly
information, which results in grouped signals, can result in contagion. Unlike the literature, we do not
simply look at the total number of news stories to proxy information, but distinguish between stories about
a single country or many countries. Lastly, we offer an explanation for why emerging markets are more
affected by contagion than developed or developing economies, which current models cannot explain. The
reason is that emerging markets suffer more from information frictions.
The intuition for our results is that costly information may cause investors to group signals about coun-
tries, because such imprecise signals are cheaper, instead of obtaining detailed information for each country.
The empirical evidence from Hameed et al. (2015) also suggests that investors tend to choose signals that
are predictors of many assets3. This complementarity in information leads to complementarity in investors’
behavior across countries. Therefore, if investors cut credit to one country, it may cause them to do the same
1The term ”contagion” was introduced into the economic literature with the background of the Asian crisis (Claessens and
Forbes (2004)). An analysis of the Asian crisis can be found e.g. in Perry and Lederman (1998).
2Boyer et al. (2006) for example show empirically that asset holdings of international investors are a channel through which
stock market crises are spread globally.
3They find that analysts of American stock exchanges disproportionally follow firms who serve as good predictors for their
peers. Furthermore, when earnings forecasts for such followed firms are revised, the prices of other firms are affected significantly.
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in another, which is observed as contagion. Moreover, this information channel of contagion is stronger
for emerging markets, as investors find it less worthwhile to obtain detailed information for such countries.
This is because information discovery costs are high4 and there is less demand for specific information on
emerging markets due to a lower number of interested investors5. Such issues make country-specific infor-
mation on emerging markets more expensive, partially because there are less investors to carry the fixed cost
of information6. Furthermore, lower excess returns in emerging markets lower the benefits of detailed infor-
mation. Nevertheless, for emerging markets, information costs are not likely to be high enough to result in
no information whatsoever. If investors do not inform themselves at all, then there is no information induced
contagion in our model, which explains why the least developed countries are rarely affected. Hence, it is
most likely that investors group signals for emerging markets, which drives contagion in our model.
We find empirical evidence for our prediction that costly information can cause contagion and make it
likelier for emerging markets. Many previous empirical studies on information frictions use the number of
newspaper articles7 to measure information flows. Using a novel data set, we go further and look at the type
of news stories as an important factor. We consider news stories with a headline or first paragraph about a
multitude of countries as joint signals. Our empirical results show that considering the type of information
processed by agents matters and that joint news increases the comovement of asset prices across countries.
We address endogeneity by using terror attacks, which crowd out other news, thereby generating exogenous
financial news variation. The number of fatalities from a terror attack is used as an instrumental variable
for joint news, as this likely proxies the extent of news coverage on the attack. Furthermore, the attacks
in our sample are all relatively small and are not expected to affect the global economy. We find a nega-
tive relationship between grouped signals and market valuation as well as a positive relationship between
grouped signals and the cost of information production, supporting the hypothesis that information frictions
affect less developed countries to a higher degree. This evidence reinforces the importance of information
frictions in international crisis contagion, highlighting a previously unexplored type of information friction
in this context. A policy implication of our findings is that emerging markets can benefit from providing
better and cheaper information.
In our paper, contagion is not considered in the sense of Dornbusch et al. (2000) as increased covariance
of asset prices or financial flows after a shock, relative to this covariance in normal times. Rather, we
examine it as steady excess covariance, which is particularly apparent when large disruptions, such as crises,
occur. This is consistent with the finding of Forbes and Rigobon (2002), who show that for the 1997 Asian
crisis and 1994 Mexican devaluation, there was a high level of comovement in all periods, but virtually no
increase in correlation during the crisis. Similarly to Mondria and Quintana-Domeque (2013) we consider
contagion as a price drop in one market due to a crisis in another, where the fundamentals of the two are
independent. Contagion in our context is also similar to the definition of Calvo and Mendoza (2000b), who
consider contagion as observed portfolio changes that are not a result of fundamentals.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature, whereas section
3 presents the model. In section 4 we present the empirical evidence, while section 5 concludes.
4See e.g. Calvo (2004) and Kra¨ussl (2005).
5Mondria et al. (2010) similarly expect larger countries to receive more attention.
6The result that the price of information can decrease with demand was prominently used in Veldkamp (2006b),Veldkamp
(2006a) and Veldkamp and Wolfers (2007) as well.
7Examples include Fang and Peress (2009), Mondria and Quintana-Domeque (2013) and Veldkamp (2006b).
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2 Literature Review
There is a large body of work dealing with international contagion, which has been nicely summarized
in Dornbusch et al. (2000) and more recently in Forbes (2012). As they point out, the mechanisms are
either through trade linkages, financial linkages, reassessments of fundamentals (wake-up calls) or country
similarities such as macroeconomic characteristics or geographic proximity.
Not much attention has been given so far to information frictions as a reason for crises spreading among
emerging markets. There is, however, reason to believe that information frictions are relevant in this context.
Especially for the international crises in the mid to late 1990s, i.e. the Mexican crisis in 1994, the Asian
crisis in 1997 and the Russian crisis in 1998, the role of information was seen as a possible explanation8 for
the observed vulnerability and the rapid transmission of shocks across countries. Furthermore, Calvo (2004)
suggests the existence of high fixed costs in obtaining information and keeping up with the developments in
emerging economies is an issue. Calvo and Mendoza (2000b) also argue that information frictions are very
important for emerging markets. They claim that it is an empirical regularity that credit ratings of emerging
markets are more volatile than others, meaning information plays a larger role here. Furthermore, they
argue that empirically, information changes lead to larger adjustments for emerging markets than for OECD
countries. Kra¨ussl (2005) also provides empirical evidence that information frictions are a bigger issue in
emerging markets than for developed countries, by examining the effects of public credit ratings. These
ratings should have no substantial effect if investors are already informed about the countries, especially
since these agencies do not have more access to information than private investors. He shows that credit
ratings have a large influence on the volatility and volume of foreign credit in emerging markets, thereby
indicating that information frictions play a role in there.
Several papers have focused on the role asymmetric information can play for contagion (Kodres and
Pritsker (2002), Yuan (2005), Pasquariello (2007)). We will not rely on such differences in information, but
instead focus on information frictions in the form of costly information for all investors. The two papers
most related to ours are Calvo and Mendoza (2000b) and Mondria and Quintana-Domeque (2013), who
study the spread of the East Asian Crisis. Another related paper is Veldkamp (2006a), who does not directly
study contagion, but does have some relevant implications.
In Calvo and Mendoza (2000b) contagion is reflected in portfolio changes that are not a result of funda-
mentals. The information friction is that investors can acquire and process country-specific information at
a fixed cost. In this model, the information frictions per se cannot produce contagion. Either short-selling
constraints or portfolio manager performance costs are additionally necessary. A negative, but credible,
rumor may have real effects in their model, since verifying the rumor may be too costly and it is believed
otherwise. Short-selling constraints are required to prevent investors from taking full advantage of costly
information. Alternatively, portfolio managers’ performance costs can produce contagion, if the marginal
cost of underperforming is larger than the marginal benefit of outperforming the market. There is then an
equilibrium in which all investors hold the same portfolio. Furthermore, it is possible that a rumor calling for
a different market portfolio can cause inefficient herding behavior9, where all investors reset their portfolios.
Unlike Calvo and Mendoza (2000b), we do not rely on rumors and in our model information frictions can
8See Calvo and Mendoza (2000a)
9Veldkamp (2006b) also studies herds in emerging equity markets, but does not discuss international contagion.
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cause contagion even without short-selling constraints or performance costs.
Mondria and Quintana-Domeque (2013) apply the concept of rational inattention, i.e. investors’ limited
information processing ability, to the transmission of the Asian crisis in 1997 across countries. Contagion
is defined there as an increase in uncertainty and a price drop in one market due to the occurrence of a
crisis in another, without the two markets being linked by fundamentals. Attention of agents is assumed
to be constrained as in rational inattention models10. Their mechanism of contagion entails the following
chain of events: First, a crisis hits one market. Investors then shift their attention to this market to counter
the increased uncertainty there. As attention is limited, this leads to attention being shifted away from the
second market. Due to the agents having less information about the second market, it is now seen as more
uncertain by the investors, who reduce their investment as a result.
Mondria and Quintana-Domeque (2013) make three theoretical predictions. First, higher volatility in
the Asian markets should increase the relative attention to Asia. Second, the more relative attention given
to Asia, the higher the volatility should be in Latin America. Lastly, more relative attention given to Asia,
lowers expected prices in Latin American markets. The authors measure attention by counting the number of
newspaper articles in the Financial Times (FT) with the name or adjective of a given country in the headline
or first paragraph of the article. The number of articles in the FT about Thailand relative to those about
Argentina, Brazil and Chile are used to proxy the relative attention of Asian to Latin American markets.
Mondria and Quintana-Domeque find supporting empirical evidence for their predictions of an increase in
Asian volatility leading to more attention being allocated to Asia (here Thailand) and less attention on the
three Latin American countries. Furthermore, there is some empirical support for the hypothesis that more
relative attention toward Asia leads to higher market volatilities in Latin American countries11. Finally, the
authors also test if the price indices in Latin America are negatively correlated with the relative attention
levels to Asia, but find very limited support for the hypothesis.
Unlike Mondria and Quintana-Domeque (2013), our model is not based on rational inattention, but
rather on costly and noisy signals. We look at similar empirical data, but expand the number of countries
considered. Unlike them, however, our data considers the type of news, namely whether a story is jointly
related to several countries, or is focused on one country. Our model implies that investors may group
signals, especially for emerging markets, which we proxy as joint news stories. It is precisely these joint
news stories that drive contagion in our model.
Veldkamp (2006a) presents a model showing that information frictions can explain the excess covariance
of asset prices12. In her context, when a piece of information can help forecast the value of many assets, and
that information is observed by many investors, assets can exhibit excess covariance. Another interesting
conclusion in Veldkamp (2006a) is that investors are more interested in assets that have a high value. The
consequence of this is that information frictions will play a stronger role for less valuable assets, such as
those in emerging markets. We present a similar insight and apply it to explain why contagion is seen more
often in emerging markets than in developed economies. Our mechanism for excess covariance and our in-
formation production structure is similar to hers, with information that is demanded by many investors being
10For a review of the literature see Sims (2010), Veldkamp (2011) and Wiederholt et al. (2010).
11Although the authors admit the strength of this support is debatable.
12Veldkamp and Wolfers (2007) use a similar information friction argument, with imperfect information about productivity, to
explain excessive comovement among the industries of a country instead of assets.
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cheaper. As Veldkamp (2006a) points out, this resembles information markets in reality, with newspapers
like the Wall Street Journal or the FT being much cheaper than specialized investment reports. Although our
models are similar, there are some key differences. In Veldkamp (2006a), purchasing information about one
asset can lead to excess covariance of two other assets, if the two other assets are correlated with the asset
for which the information was purchased. However, such excess covariance requires the first asset to have
some fundamental covariance with the other two. In our model, the result does not require any fundamental
covariance. Furthermore, she does not analyze joint vs. specific signals as we do here. Lastly, information
is modeled differently here. In her model, assets have a learnable and unlearnable component and agents
can purchase full information about the learnable component. In our context, investors obtain a noisy signal
and assets do not feature a learnable and unlearnable component explicitly.
3 A Model of Contagion and Information Frictions
This section introduces a model of information frictions that can lead to excess covariance among unrelated
assets. The idea is that costly information can cause investors to group signals about several emerging market
countries. In this case, the assets will be correlated due to the correlated information investors receive, even
if the asset fundamentals are independent. Furthermore, this framework explains why contagion appears to
be a bigger issue for emerging markets than for very developed or undeveloped countries. This is because
information on small markets will be more expensive and the benefits from detailed information lower. This
makes the grouping of information likelier, thereby inducing covariance in emerging markets. Furthermore,
for the least developed countries, information costs can be so high that investors do not inform themselves
at all, thereby not resulting in any information induced contagion there. While many studies examine the
amount of information, our paper considers the type information as a new relevant channel.
There are two countries of equal size, M and R, indexed by the subscript i ∈ {M,R}. There is a
finite but large number λ of identical price-taking agents with mean-variance utility functions. The optimal
portfolio and market prices under these preferences are equivalent to those under constant absolute risk
aversion (CARA) utility functions, which are often assumed13 in such models. Expected utility in vector
notation is given by:
U = E[q′(E(θi|Sj)− pr)− ρ
2
q′V ar(θi|Sj)q − cj ] (1)
Here q denotes the (2x1) vector of asset quantities purchased, p denotes the vector of asset prices, r is
the risk free rate, cj = c(Sj) is the cost of the signal Sj , V ar represents a variance covariance matrix and
ρ is a preference parameter capturing risk aversion. To simplify notation, we will define µˆ ≡ E(θi|Sj) and
V ar(θi|Sj) ≡ Σˆ.
The fundamentals of each country are the asset returns, which are denoted θi and are normally dis-
tributed. It is common knowledge that they are independent of each other. The prior beliefs are:
13See e.g. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Veldkamp (2006a) and Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010).
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θi ∼ N(µθi , σ2θi) and Cov(θM , θR) = 0 (2)
Investors can purchase a noisy signal about the fundamentals, denoted Sj , j ∈ {M,R,B}. There are
three signals being offered, a signal specific to country M, denoted SM , a signal specific to R, SR and a joint
signal, SB . The country-specific signals consist of the fundamental plus a zero mean noise term i. The
joint signal is a less precise signal about both country fundamentals.
Si = θi + i, SB = g(θM , θR) + B, j ∼ N(0, σ2j ) and σ2SB > σ2Si (3)
Here g(.) is a linear14, positive, increasing function. Note that it is also possible to construct SB =
g(SM , SR)
15. Note that σ2SB > σ
2
Si
can be ensured by a suffiiciently large σ2B . The returns θi and noise
terms j are independent of each other. Therefore, the country-specific signals Si are independent of each
other as well and have a bivariate normal distribution with the respective country fundamental.
In modelling information production we follow Veldkamp (2006a). Signals are produced with a fixed
cost χ and no marginal cost. Agents cannot resell purchased information and there is perfect competition16
in the production of information, which means that the price of a signal will be equal to its average cost17.
Let λj denote the number of agents purchasing the signal Sj . Furthermore, Ij is an indicator variable equal
to 1 if signal Sj is produced and zero otherwise. Formally, any agent producing a signal Sj solves:
max
cj ,Ij
∑
j
Ij(cjλj − χ) (4)
The order of events is as follows. First, agents decide on what kind of signal to purchase. Then, the
investment decision is made and lastly the payoffs are realized. The model is solved backwards.
As discussed, much of the literature has relied on asymmetric information to produce contagion. We
will therefore instead focus only on symmetric equilibria. This provides the further advantage of a sim-
pler, more tractable model. Therefore, in our model all agents make the same information choice and in
equilibrium we have λj ∈ {0, λ}. In this case, to produce contagion, all agents must purchase the joint
signal. With asymmetric information on the other hand, it suffices to show that some agents purchase the
joint signal. Furthermore, our conclusion that contagion is a bigger issue for emerging markets will remain.
This is because the excess covariance increases with the number of agents purchasing the joint signal and
in an asymmetric equilibrium, more agents purchase the joint signal for emerging markets than other coun-
tries. Hence, considering asymmetric information would produce the same results for our purposes, but
unnecessarily complicates the model. This leads to our following equilibrium definitions.
14For our purposes, a non-linear function works as well under the assumption that SB and θi are jointly normal.
15Then, the derivative of g with respect to each signal must be sufficiently large to ensure the joint signal has higher variance
than the specific signals. Furthermore, for contagion to be possible, the conditions derived later would imply a derivative of g′ < 1.
16Veldkamp (2006b) discusses imperfect competition and finds similar properties of the information market equilibrium.
17This way of pricing information has also been used in Veldkamp (2006b) and Veldkamp and Wolfers (2007).
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Definition 1. A symmetric equilibrium is given by a set of asset demands qi, asset prices pi, signal prices
cj , signal supply decisions Ij and a symmetric signal demand choice λj , given the information structure (2),
(3), rational expectations and noise shocks j , such that:
1. Given prices {pi, cj} all agents choose whether to buy a signal Sj and then choose asset demands to
maximize expected utility (1).
2. Signal prices cj are a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium that solves (4).
3. The markets for assets and information clear.
Definition 2. A contagion equilibrium is a symmetric market equilibrium such that asset prices exhibit
excess covariance.
We first solve the portfolio problem. Let x denote the vector of asset supplies. The optimal portfolio
and market price from solving the investor problem are:
q∗ =
1
ρ
Σˆ−1[µˆ− pr] (5)
p =
1
r
[µˆ− ρΣˆx] (6)
What remains is the optimal information choice. As the following proposition shows, the purchase of
joint news is crucial in leading to contagion. Note that any correlation would be excessive, as the two
countries’ fundamentals are independent.
Proposition 1. A symmetric market equilibrium is a contagion equilibrium if and only if the joint signal is
purchased. The excess covariance tends to zero as the variance of the joint signal increases.
Proof. Excess covariance is required for a contagion equilibrium. First, note that with perfect information
the covariance should be zero, as the fundamentals are independent. Therefore, any covariance is excessive.
Let Pi(Sj) denote the price of asset i under signal Sj .
The covariance between the two prices if the country-specific signals are observed,Cov(PM (SM ), PR(SG)),
will be zero. This is because the only random variable in the asset price of a country is the country-specific
signal, which is independent across countries. Hence, there will be no covariance. Similarly, with no infor-
mation, there is also no covariance.
We now turn to the case where the investors observe the joint signal SB . From equation (6) we have:
PM (SB) =
1
r
[
µθM +
σ2θM
σ2SB
[SB − E(SB)]− ρxM σ2θM
(
1− σ
2
θM
σ2SB
)]
PR(SB) =
1
r
[
µθR +
σ2θR
σ2SB
[SB − E(SB)]− ρxR σ2θR
(
1− σ
2
θR
σ2SB
)]
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The covariance therefore is:
Cov(PM (SB), PR(SB)) =
σ2θM
σ2θR
r2σ2SB
> 0
which is decreasing in σ2SB .
Since the same joint signal enters the portfolio decision for both assets, there is covariance between the
markets, even though they are independent. The intuition for contagion is that, due to the joint signal, if
asset sales are warranted in country M, leading to a crisis there, investors will also sell their assets in country
R, thereby causing a crisis there as well. Hence, contagion becomes possible in this model. Furthermore,
information frictions in the form of noisy signals alone are not sufficient for contagion, unless investors
group signals. Interestingly, if the variance of the joint signal goes to infinity, making it uninformative, the
excess covariance will also go to zero. This is because investors believe less in the joint signal, the less
informative it becomes. In this case, a little information on both countries can be more harmful in terms of
contagion than no information. We now turn to the conditions under which a contagion equilibrium occurs.
Proposition 2. A contagion equilibrium exists if and only if σ2SB < σ
2
Si
+ σ2i and one of the following
conditions holds:
1. Average information costs χλ are intermediate.
2. Average information costs are high and excess returns (µθi − pr) are intermediate.
3. Agents inform themselves and σ2i or σ
2
θi
are sufficiently high.
Proof. See appendix.
The exact ranges for the parameters are discussed in the proof. The restriction on σ2SB is to ensure that
the joint signal is not strictly dominated. If such a signal is very noisy, it becomes useless and is therefore
never purchased. Recall that the price of a signal is given by the average information costs. If signals are
cheap, then the country-specific signals, which have better information content, will be purchased. Similarly,
if signal prices are excessive, no information becomes optimal. Hence, the joint signal is only purchased for
an intermediate level of average information costs, which depends negatively on the number of potentially
interested investors λ. Therefore, larger countries have inherently cheaper country-specific information, if
investors are home-biased. Furthermore, markets of developed countries, for which there is a lot of interest,
will also have cheaper information and will be less likely to suffer from these types of information frictions.
Signal prices also depend positively on the cost of information discovery χ. We might expect the costs
of information production to be larger in emerging markets than in developed countries, due to factors such
as a lack of infrastructure or data quality issues. Calvo (2004) also argues that there are larger costs for
information on emerging markets. Further, Calvo and Mendoza (2000b) as well as Kra¨ussl (2005) find
evidence that information issues may be larger in emerging markets. Such factors make contagion in less
developed countries likelier. On the other hand, if information discovery costs are prohibitively high and no
information is consumed, there will not be a contagion equilibrium.
The benefit from country-specific signals increases with the excess returns. Hence, if rich markets
promise better returns, it is less likely for investors to group signals of those countries. If countries offer
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very low returns, then no information can again be optimal and investors do not purchase the joint signal.
Lastly, if σ2i or σ
2
θi
are sufficiently high, then the country-specific signals become as noisy as the joint signal
and offer no additional benefit. Hence, if no information is not optimal, then in this case the joint signal can
become optimal. Such a case is also more realistic for emerging market countries.
In conclusion, we do not expect developed countries to be hit by contagion, while for emerging markets
this becomes a real possibility. At the other extreme, investors may not purchase any information for the
least developed countries, which means there is no information induced contagion for them. This can explain
why contagion episodes are rarely observed among very developed or undeveloped countries. Therefore, our
framework can explain why it is precisely emerging market countries that are more susceptible to contagion,
as noted by Claessens (2005). This insight is summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 1. A contagion equilibrium is likelier for emerging market countries than for very undeveloped
or developed countries.
Contagion occurs here even though all agents are behaving rationally. With information frictions, the
investors rationally do not find it worthwhile to strongly inform themselves about emerging markets, which
in a way creates a negative externality. The empirical literature often sees contagion as a regional phe-
nomenon18. This could arise in an extension of our model. Faced with the prospect of investing in many
different countries and with different combinations of signals being offered, the investors may find it optimal
to group signals of similar countries. Hence, the optimal joint signals are likely to contain groups of similar
countries, which would lead to contagion among them.
4 Empirical Evidence
This section presents empirical evidence supporting the theoretical implications of our model. As stated
in the introduction, our paper has three main novelties. The first is that we take into account differences
in the information structure i.e. the type of information an agent receives as opposed to just the amount
of information processed by agents. Of special interest for our propositions 1 and 2 are the existence of
grouped signals – or joint news – that are processed by international investors. The second novelty is that
the information structure can cause contagion i.e. joint news result in excess comovement of asset prices,
which is our proposition 1. The last novelty is that our theory predicts joint signals to be more common
for countries with intermediate cost of information, high information cost and intermediate excess returns
or very volatile country-specific fundamentals or signals – our proposition 2 – which offers an explanation
why contagion affects emerging markets countries more often.
Our data set covers the time period from January 1996 to December 1999. This time frame is selected
as it includes the Asian Crisis of 1997-1998, the following crisis in Latin America as well as some time not
marked by any specific crisis, or tranquil, for the included countries. The reason for this selection is that
according to our theory, information frictions play a role in times of crisis as well as more tranquil times.
During periods of crisis, however, the steady excess covariance of assets is especially apparent. The period
from 1st January 1997 to 30th June 199819 is defined as the Asian crisis period.
18See e.g. Forbes and Warnock (2012).
19This coincides with the sample period from Mondria and Quintana-Domeque (2013).
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To measure the information acquired by investors we choose an approach similar to the one used by
Mondria and Quintana-Domeque (2013) and look at the number of daily articles covering countries in our
sample that are published in the FT. The novelty of our dataset – in comparison to the data used by Mondria
and Quintana-Domeque (2013) – is that we differentiate between single and joint news i.e. articles that
cover a single country or several countries at once.
The reasons for choosing the FT are similar to the ones stated in Veldkamp (2006b, Page 586.) and
Mondria and Quintana-Domeque (2013, Page 442.). The FT has 1.8 million readers in over 140 countries.
It is published daily and therefore should reasonably match the rate in which newsworthy events occur and
are absorbed by investors especially in times before the widespread spread of information distribution via
the internet. Veldkamp (2006b) points out that out of a random sample of 100 relevant articles in the FT
97 contained information about the strength of the assets of a given country. The broad circulation of the
FT, the fact that it is published in English and its global focus20 makes it a reasonable proxy for global
information about countries concerning mainly news that is relevant for economic topics. Furthermore, the
focus on a single news source avoids the problem of double counting the investors’ signals.
The argument for a piece of information appearing in the FT being also processed by investors follows
the economic logic of the news market. An article about a certain event appears in the FT, because it is
in high demand by investors. If the demand for a certain story by investors would be too low, for instance
because it contains very specialized information, it would not be reported in the FT. If the FT would report
too many low demand stories the interest of investors (or readers of the FT in general) would decrease
and sales and subscription of the FT would drop. In order to remain profitable, the FT has to publish high
demand stories. This is also consistent with the idea of endogenous information markets21. The high demand
stories appearing in the FT are relatively cheap and consumed by a high number of readers, while the more
specialized stories like specific country reports for investors are characterized by a lower demand and are
relatively more expensive. If agents devote more attention to a country, the demand for articles about this
country increases, thereby meaning these stories are more likely to appear in the FT.
In our data, an article in the FT is regarded as being a signal about a single country if its name, adjective
or abbreviation of its currency is featured in the headline or first paragraph. For this study the number of
daily newspaper articles is counted using data from the Lexis Nexis Database. Given the sample group
of countries articles are sorted into two categories. An article in the FT containing only a reference, i.e.
name, adjective or abbreviation of currency, to a single country of our sample, but no reference to any other
country from the sample is considered to be a single news about the country. This is a proxy for attention
investors pay to a single country i.e. it reflects the type of signals that are used in the frameworks presented
by Veldkamp (2006b), Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009), Mondria et al. (2010), Van Nieuwerburgh
and Veldkamp (2010) or Mondria and Quintana-Domeque (2013). To allow for the possibility of signals that
are a combination of the information about two or more countries, joint signals22 are counted separately.
The proxy for a joint signal is if references to at least two countries of the group appear in either the headline
or the first paragraph of a FT article. This definition is chosen in order to avoid double counting of joint
news and single news.
20See footnote 16 in Mondria and Quintana-Domeque (2013).
21See Veldkamp (2006a).
22See the signals used in Veldkamp (2006a), Veldkamp and Wolfers (2007) or Mondria (2010).
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Importantly, joint news articles are not evaluated in how far each of the included countries plays a role.
While this leaves the exact weights of the joint signals with respect to the included countries open, it still
requires an article that is counted as joint news to be at least covering two countries in the title or the first
paragraph i.e. it is not enough for a country name to be mentioned in a later part of the article for it to be
counted as joint news. By concentrating our selection criteria on the headline and the first paragraph we feel
reasonably assured of capturing the true object of the signal.
Furthermore, we consider the sum of single and joint articles referring to a certain country as overall
news, which we take as a proxy for general attention that is paid to a country. This allows us to study the
amount of attention any country faces in general as well as a closer look at the structure of this attention, i.e.
whether the news about a certain country are dominated by more precise single news or less precise joint
news articles.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics - News
Countries Single News Joint News Overall News
Asia 6954 1029 7983
Thailand 1790 722 2512
Malaysia 1570 679 2249
Philippines 1438 396 1834
Indonesia 2156 696 2852
Latin America 6920 937 7857
Brazil 2414 765 3179
Mexico 2658 528 3186
Argentina 1005 646 1651
Chile 843 370 1213
Daily number of news articles in FT. Source: Lexis Nexis Database.
Period: 1st January 1996 to 31st December 1999.
Table 1 presents an overview of the number of single, joint and overall news for each country included
in this study as well as the aggregated values23 for the groups of Asian and Latin American countries in the
sample.
In order to get a measure of importance of joint signals for countries, the ratio of joint news to overall
news24 is calculated for the entire sample. An increase in the joint news ratio while the overall news remains
constant therefore signifies a reduction in the precision of the information demanded about a given country.
It is important to consider that we measure attention by the raw number of articles being published in
the FT without specifically aiming for content beyond the reference criteria given above and the exclusion
of non-business articles from the selected articles. The classification25 of articles into business and non-
business news was done by using the categories provided by the Lexis Nexis database. While an article
about a non-business news topic e.g. sports or societal events can also be seen as attention that is paid to
23Note that the aggregated values for joint news for the groups differ from the simple sum of the joint news of the countries as
the definition of joint news also takes into account joint articles with other states from the sample but different group of countries.
The aggregated values of joint news exclude joint news between the two groups.
24This will be named the joint news ratio for the remainder of this paper.
25The exact code for the selection criteria of articles is available upon request.
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a certain country, it is less likely to be information that is processed by investors with sparse capacity of
attention to make investment decisions. Therefore, the number of articles without non-business news is
regarded as a closer proxy to the true attention of international investors. Nonetheless, to be able to take the
non-financial attention that a country faces into account we also collect the overall amount of Daily Mirror26
news about countries from the Lexis Nexis Database and add these as a separate variable to our database.
The countries in the sample are divided into two groups. Similar to Mondria and Quintana-Domeque
(2013), we are interested in the effects of the Asian crisis in Latin America. Therefore, like Mondria
and Quintana-Domeque (2013), we select Thailand for Asia and Argentina, Brazil and Chile for Latin
America. To fully capture the effects of the Asian crisis, we add Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines,
as these countries played a prominent role27 during this episode. Furthermore, we add Mexico due to its
economic importance to our sample of Latin American countries.
One important issue to consider with respect to the countries in our sample and the FT as our proxy for
the attention of investors is the timing28 of the variables included. The events of the Asian crisis taken as
the main drivers of uncertainty in our sample take place in South-East Asia several time zones to the east of
London, the place where the FT is edited. The Latin American countries in our sample on the other hand are
located a few time zones to the west of London. As a consequence, uncertainty in the Asian market can only
appear in an FT article of the following day. Furthermore, uncertainty in the Latin American stock market
cannot affect Asian stock market on the same day.
To observe asset price movements, a measure of stock market prices is included. As a source for a
country’s stock market valuation we use Datastream Global Index, from which the daily value of the total
market value is taken. In order to make the values comparable across countries the asset prices are evaluated
in US-dollars (USD). Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the collected data on market valuation.
The volatility of the daily stock market returns are modeled as a GARCH (generalized autoregressive
conditional heteroscedastic) process as is standard29 in the literature.
Furthermore, we use a number of control variables. To account for fundamental channels of contagion
we add monthly trade flows between the countries in the sample from the Direction of Trade Statistics
(DOTS) of the IMF. We also include 3 month and 6 month US interest rates to control for global economic
effects as well as day of week, month or year indicators and a quadratic time trend.
We first study the differences of effects of single news, overall news and joint news in cases of in-
ternational shifts of attention. In order to do this we take parts of the empirical study of Mondria and
Quintana-Domeque (2013) and test how the results therein are affected by taking the type of signals pro-
cessed by investors into account. We can show that some of the results of shifting attention in times of crisis
presented by Mondria and Quintana-Domeque (2013) are confirmed with our data. The fact that our sample
allows to test for the effects of different types of attention allows for a clearer picture, though.
26In this we follow again Mondria and Quintana-Domeque (2013).
27South Korea joined the OECD in 1996 making it somewhat closer to developed countries than the other four Asian nations in
our sample. It was therefore left out of the sample, although it was also affected by the Asian crisis.
28This point is also made by Mondria and Quintana-Domeque (2013).
29We follow Mondria and Quintana-Domeque (2013). For more information on GARCH see e.g. Bollerslev (1987).
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics - Market Valuation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Market Valuation N mean sd min max
Asia
Thailand (million USD) 1,045 0.0456 0.0244 0.0129 0.0957
Malaysia (million USD) 1,045 0.109 0.0525 0.0301 0.195
Philippines (million USD) 1,045 0.0409 0.0140 0.0149 0.0668
Indonesia (million USD) 1,045 0.0410 0.0214 0.00821 0.0766
Latin America
Brazil (million USD) 1,045 0.132 0.0326 0.0662 0.216
Mexico (million USD) 1,045 0.0921 0.0181 0.0547 0.135
Argentina (million USD) 1,045 0.0463 0.00761 0.0300 0.0632
Chile (million USD) 1,045 0.0477 0.00674 0.0306 0.0635
Aggregations
Asia (million USD) 1,045 0.236 0.107 0.0706 0.391
Latin America (million USD) 1,045 0.319 0.0569 0.196 0.438
Source: Datastream Global Index. Last accessed 2nd March 2017.
To study the attention shift during the Asian crisis we estimate the following equation30:
V oljt = pi
j + γjAttentionAsiat,i + X
′
tΓ + u
j
t (7)
where AttentionAsiat,i is the attention in absolute or relative
31 terms paid to Asia on day t. The index i
denotes the type of signal used in the estimation, with i ∈ (Single, Joint,Overall) being one of our three
proxies for investor attention. V oljt is the daily volatility of stock market returns in country j, with j being
one of the Latin American countries of our sample. X is a vector of control variables i.e. a day of the
week and year indicator, a quadratic time trend and 3 month and 6 month US Treasury Bill interest rates.
We exclude the data for the year 1996 from the estimation to avoid any lingering effects of the Mexican
peso crisis in 1994 and 1995 and make the estimation more the estimation more comparable to Mondria and
Quintana-Domeque (2013).
We estimate equation (7) using the absolute and relative amount of attention once for each type of signal
that we consider. The four countries of Latin America create a system of four equations, one for each
country that we then estimate with seemingly unrelated regressions32 (SUR). Table 3 shows the results of
this estimation. We find that on average an increase of absolute attention towards Asia increases the volatility
in Latin American countries, largely driven by increased uncertainty in Mexico. The coefficients of interest
for overall news are jointly significant on at least a 5 % level. For the cases of single and joint news we do not
find significant joint effects although we find increases in joint Asian news to increase volatilities in Mexico
and Brazil to be significant on 5 % and 10 % level, respectively. For our estimation with relative Asian news
on the other hand, we can find only a significant effect on a 10 % level of single news on Latin American
volatility. Hence, if single news about Asia increase relative to single news about Latin American countries,
30See Mondria and Quintana-Domeque (2013).
31Relative to the Latin American countries in our sample.
32We additionally estimated equation (7) with 2SLS using the amount of non-financial news as an instrument for relative atten-
tion. The results can be found in table 9 in the appendix.
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we find that this results in increased uncertainty in the Latin American stock market. This effect cannot be
found for the cases of relative joint or overall news, though, which are insignificant in our estimation. The
results of the Breusch-Pagan test of independence give support to the hypothesis that errors in our systems
of equations are correlated.
Table 3: Estimation equation 7 - OLS
Brazil Mexico Argentina Chile
Absolute Attention
Single News Coefficient 0.0001319 0.0000807 0.0000153 0.0000572∗
(0.000117) (0.0000696) (0.0000743) (0.0000319)
Breusch-Pagan test 990.075∗∗∗
p-value 0.0000
Joint significance 1.58
p-value 0.2087
Observations 783 783 783 783
Joint News Coefficient 0.0001371∗∗ 0.0001104∗ 0.0000153 0.00000156
(0.0000906) (0.0000536) (0.0000572) (0.0000247)
Breusch-Pagan test 993.328∗∗∗
p-value 0.0000
Joint significance 2.68
p-value 0.1017
Observations 783 783 783 783
Overall News Coefficient 0.0000699 0.0001116∗∗∗ 0.0000721 0.0000215
(0.0000703) (0.0000416) (0.0000445) (0.0000192)
Breusch-Pagan test 987.555∗∗∗
p-value 0.0000
Joint significance 4.11∗∗
p-value 0.0427
Observations 783 783 783 783
Relative Attention
Single News Coefficient 0.0003878 0.000402∗ 0.0001894 0.0001949∗∗
(0.0003657) (0.0002164) (0.0002319) (0.0000994)
Breusch-Pagan test 965.280∗∗∗
p-value 0.0000
Joint significance 2.76∗
p-value 0.0965
Observations 768 768 768 768
Joint News Coefficient -0.0001026 0.0000227 -0.0000255 -0.0001109∗
(0.0002195) (0.0001598) (0.0001538) (0.000067)
Breusch-Pagan test 584.421∗∗∗
p-value 0.0000
Joint significance 0.20
p-value 0.6529
Observations 361 361 361 361
Overall News Coefficient -0.0001441 0.0000632 0.0000825 -0.00000773
(0.0002769) (0.0001642) (0.0001756) (0.0000754)
Breusch-Pagan test 974.016∗∗∗
p-value 0.0000
Joint significance 0.00
p-value 0.9908
Observations 770 770 770 770
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
These results show that it is important to take the different types of news into account when analyzing the
effects of processed information by investors on the market. Estimating equation (7) we find some support
for the prediction by Mondria and Quintana-Domeque (2013) that the shifting attention causes uncertainty
in Latin American countries. Importantly, we find that the estimated effect strongly depends on the type of
news that we consider as a measure of attention paid to a country. Taking the case of an increase in absolute
attention33 directed towards the Asian countries, for instance, we see that more overall news attention seems
to increase the uncertainty in the Latin American markets. This does not hold for an increase in joint news
for Asia. For a shift in relative attention from Latin America to Asia we can only find the increase in
uncertainty for a rise in the ratio of single news in Asia. Notably, we do not find any effect of shifting joint
news between Asia and Latin America on the uncertainty in Latin America which is in line with our model.
As stated in proposition 1, we regard joint news to have a special effect on investors. To further explore
the role of joint news we estimate the following equation to test how the importance of joint news about
33This can be justified as a shift in attention away from Latin America to Asia if we assume that the information processing
capacity of agents is fixed and limited and agents do not only shift attention from other parts of the world to Asia.
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Latin America changed during the time of increased uncertainty in Asia:
JointLAt = ρ
LA
1 + ρ
LA
2 V ol
Asia
t−1 + X
′
tΦ
LA + εLAt (8)
JointLAt is either the absolute amount of joint news in Latin America on day t or the joint news ratio in t.
The variable of interest is V olAsiat−1 , the volatility in Asia at t−1. We expect the coefficient ρLA2 to be positive
i.e. that increasing uncertainty in Asia as happened during the Asian crisis led to more joint signals about
Latin America being processed by investors. X is again a vector of controls. Note that the reason for taking
the Asian volatility of the preceding day is that due to the different time zones of Asia, Latin America and
London, i.e. the place where editing of the FT takes place, any news stories about uncertainty in the Asian
market would appear in the FT of the following day. This timing of the variables also ensures that changes
in the volatility in Asia affect the news about Latin America and not in the other direction in our estimation.
Table 4: Joint news shift
(1) (2)
Joint News Latin America Joint News Latin America (% overall)
Lagged Volatility Asia 22.50∗∗ 113.2∗
(2.08) (1.79)
Quadratic time trend -2.082 -5.429
(-1.59) (-0.80)
3-Month interest rate 1.783 11.00
(1.06) (1.22)
6-Month interest rate -2.686∗ -15.17∗
(-1.65) (-1.82)
Constant 7.989∗∗∗ 42.73∗∗∗
(3.20) (3.10)
Weekday dummies Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes
Observations 1044 1027
Adjusted R2 0.024 0.020
Robust t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Estimating equation (8) we find the coefficient of lagged Asian volatility to be positive and significant
for both of our dependent variables. On average, increases in the uncertainty in Asia led to more signals
about Latin American countries being grouped and a higher share of overall attention paid towards Latin
America becoming less precise joint news. We find that a one standard deviation increase of volatility in the
Asian market results in an increase of 8.91 % of absolute joint news or a 8.33 % standard deviation increase
of the share of joint news in Latin America the following day. This supports the hypothesis that investors
grouped signals in times of the Asian crisis. We therefore find that the effects of the Asian crisis could be
seen to affect the structure of the news market in Latin America. In the context of our model, this can occur,
because the increased resources devoted to Asian news, can increase the cost of finding specific information
for Latin America, as this must now be done with less resources. For example, with more of the newspaper’s
journalists devoted to Asian news, the remaining few covering Latin America would have to work overtime
15
to obtain specific news. The resources available to the newspaper (e.g. number of journalists) may very well
be fixed in the short run.
The next step is to look at the evidence for proposition 1. Our model predicts that joint news in Latin
America will lead to excess comovement of asset prices among the respective countries. To empirically test
this prediction we estimate the following equation:
Covτ,i,j = ω0 + ω1Jointτ−1,i,j + ζAτ,i,j + Y′tΨ + τ,i,j (9)
where Covτ,i,j is either the covariance or the correlation of the stock market prices of countries i and j in τ .
We estimate equation (9) with both measures of comovement as dependent variables to test the validity of
our proposition 1. Jointτ−1,i,j is the amount of joint news about countries i and j in τ −1. Aτ,i,j is the sum
of the attention that countries i and j face. We apply two different measures – the amount of single news
and overall news – of general attention that the countries face and expect our proposition 1 to hold with both
measures. Y is a vector of control variables like the strength of the trade link between countries i and j to
control for fundamental contagion links and the sum of the market valuation of the stock market of the two
countries as a measure of economic size. Additionally, we control for strength of the trade links to Asia to
take care of fundamental contagion between Asia and Latin America in this time period. As in the previous
estimations, we also include the weekday indicators, a quadratic time trend, month indicators to control for
any special effects in certain months, e.g. any global event affecting the global news markets, and the US
interest rates.
To make use of the daily frequency of the data in our sample, we calculate the covariance and correlation
of market returns over a rolling window of 30 days. Similarly, we compute the amount of articles, single and
overall, for the same rolling window. Therefore, for each day the new day of market return data is added to
the calculation of the covariance and correlation and analogously to the single and overall news, while the
31st day of the rolling window is falling out. This makes sure that we have daily variation in our variables
of comovement and attention and keeps the time order of lagged joint news to concurrent comovement of
market returns at the same time.
One important point about the estimation of our proposition 1 is that we expect information frictions
to create non-fundamental based contagion as opposed to contagion between two countries due to funda-
mental linkages34 such as trade flows. Our theoretical model in the previous chapter excluded any type of
fundamental contagion by having the fundamentals, specific signals and noise terms being independent of
each other. This obviously does not hold in the real world where countries are linked through a number of
fundamental channels with different strengths almost all the time. The goal of the estimation of equation
9 is to estimate the strength of the non-fundamental based contagion between countries. Therefore, we not
only include the trade flows as one of the main fundamental channels of contagion as a control we also
have to consider any potential issues of endogeneity for our variable of interest i.e. in how far joint news
exogenously drive asset price comovement.
There are two possible issues of endogeneity with this estimation. One is the problem of reverse causal-
ity, i.e. that the joint news do not only create comovement but are themselves a result of existing changes
in the comovement of market returns. By taking the lagged amount of joint news as the variable of interest,
34For a more detailed description of types of contagion see Dornbusch et al. (2000).
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we avoid the possibility of comovement affecting joint news. The second issue is the possibility of omitted
variables bias in our estimation. This is the case if there is a variable omitted from our regression that would
be correlated with the amount of lagged joint news in our estimation and at the same time affect the comove-
ment of market returns in the sample period. An example would be an event affecting both countries at the
same time resulting in fundamental contagion i.e. increased comovement as well as a higher amount of joint
news about the two countries that are affected. In this case the coefficient of interest in our estimation would
be biased. To account for this possible source of endogeneity, we instrument the amount of lagged joint
news of two countries and estimate equation 9 with 2-stage least squares (2SLS). Any suitable instrument
has to fulfill two criteria. On the one hand the exclusion restriction means that the dependent variable cannot
be affected by the instrument itself. On the other hand the instrument itself has to be (partially) correlated
with our potential endogenous variable of interest.
We consider two instruments in our estimation that fulfill these criteria. The first is to instrument joint
news with the lagged value of volatility in the Asian market. The exclusion restriction requires that comove-
ment within Latin America is not affected by previous Asian volatility. From our estimation of equation (8)
we find that the amount of joint news is affected by the volatility in the Asian stock market. The results of
the estimation with the lagged Asian volatility as an instrument are presented in table 10.
Table 5: Proposition 1 - Asian volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Asset price covariance (level) Asset price correlation
Lagged Joint News 0.000117∗∗∗ 0.000117∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗
(4.24) (4.29) (4.90) (4.91)
Attention (single news) 0.00000166∗∗∗ 0.000412∗∗∗
(9.45) (2.68)
Attention (overall news) 0.00000154∗∗∗ 0.000179
(8.14) (1.11)
Trade flows 7.52e-14∗∗∗ 6.35e-14∗∗∗ 2.45e-11∗∗ 2.04e-11∗
(4.91) (4.25) (1.98) (1.67)
Market valuation -1.76e-11∗∗∗ -1.79e-11∗∗∗ 7.44e-09 1.23e-08∗∗∗
(-3.89) (-3.86) (1.62) (2.63)
Mean Trade flows with Asia 4.24e-13∗ 3.78e-13 -7.17e-10∗∗∗ -7.88e-10∗∗∗
(1.80) (1.59) (-3.13) (-3.43)
Quadratic time trend 0.000246 0.000203 -0.564 -0.576
(0.42) (0.35) (-1.10) (-1.13)
3-Month interest rate -0.000231∗∗∗ -0.000246∗∗∗ -0.0936 -0.0914
(-2.70) (-2.86) (-1.26) (-1.22)
6-Month interest rate 0.0000859 0.000102 0.0480 0.0452
(1.16) (1.37) (0.70) (0.65)
Constant 0.000272 0.000116 0.102 0.0959
(1.32) (0.57) (0.69) (0.66)
Weekday dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6096 6096 6096 6096
1st stage F-statistics 44.4977 45.029 44.4977 45.029
Olea-Pflueger statistic 44.498 45.029 44.498 45.029
Robust t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Our second instrument is the number of fatalities in terrorist attacks35 on a given day. Any terrorist
35This data can be found in the Global Terrorism Database. See National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses
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attack will affect the news cycle and therefore, affect the number of joint news about certain countries in the
FT. We assume that the more severe any terrorist attack is, the stronger the consequences on the news market
on a given day. Additionally, we don’t assume that terrorist attacks affect market comovement between two
countries. While a direct effect of terrorist attacks on the economy cannot be discounted in general (e.g. the
attacks on 11.09.2001), we do not see any attack of such significance36 in our sample period. Nonetheless,
we exclude any fatalities in attacks in the countries of our sample to avoid any potential direct effects on the
stock markets that we study. The results of this estimation can be found in tables 6 and 7. Interestingly, there
have been attacks on nearly each day of our time frame. Therefore, using this instrument does not result
in a loss of observations. Instruments regarding news congestion have been applied before, for example in
Eisensee and Stro¨mberg (2007), who study disaster relief. The occurrence of terror attacks has been used as
an instrument in Garz (2017) in the context of unemployment reports, whereas the number of fatalities has
also been used in Garz and Pagels (2018) in the context of tax evasion.
Table 6: Proposition 1 - Terrorist fatalities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Asset price covariance (level) Asset price correlation
Lagged Joint News 0.0000432∗ 0.0000401∗ 0.0635∗∗∗ 0.0633∗∗∗
(1.91) (1.80) (2.66) (2.61)
Attention (single news) 0.00000183∗∗∗ 0.000515∗∗∗
(14.32) (4.20)
Attention (overall news) 0.00000189∗∗∗ 0.000379∗∗∗
(13.29) (2.60)
Trade flows 9.35e-14∗∗∗ 8.24e-14∗∗∗ 3.56e-11∗∗∗ 3.14e-11∗∗∗
(7.59) (7.01) (3.45) (3.06)
Market valuation -1.68e-11∗∗∗ -2.14e-11∗∗∗ 7.93e-09∗∗ 1.02e-08∗∗∗
(-5.74) (-7.10) (2.19) (2.74)
Mean Trade flows with Asia 4.85e-13∗∗∗ 4.89e-13∗∗∗ -6.80e-10∗∗∗ -7.23e-10∗∗∗
(3.05) (3.09) (-3.78) (-3.98)
Quadratic time trend 0.000466 0.000431 -0.430 -0.444
(1.02) (0.96) (-1.09) (-1.12)
3-Month interest rate -0.000216∗∗∗ -0.000236∗∗∗ -0.0843 -0.0859
(-3.22) (-3.57) (-1.44) (-1.47)
6-Month interest rate 0.0000925∗ 0.000117∗∗ 0.0520 0.0538
(1.78) (2.28) (0.98) (1.00)
Constant 0.000353∗∗ 0.000156 0.151 0.119
(2.18) (0.99) (1.39) (1.11)
Weekday dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6096 6096 6096 6096
1st stage F-statistics 33.3203 32.5272 33.3203 32.5272
Olea-Pflueger statistic 33.320 32.527 33.320 32.527
Robust t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
According to proposition 1 we expect the coefficient ω1 to be significantly positive in our estimation.
Tables 5, 1037, 6 and 7 show the results of the different specifications that were estimated with the amount
of lagged shared or lagged joint news38 between the two countries as our variable of interest. In the tables
to Terrorism (START) (2017).
36Out of the 1045 days in our sample 212 days have no fatalities in terrorist attacks. The sample average of fatalities is 16.69
fatalities per day in any country but the countries in our sample. The average number of terrorist attacks, excluding attacks in the
countries of our sample is 5.39 per day making it less likely that any single big attack is having too large an effect on global asset
markets for our instrument to be valid.
37Table 10 can be found in the appendix.
38Shared news is the number of news that refer to both countries for which we use the covariance in the respective observation
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the first two columns show the estimated effects on the covariance of the market returns with column one
using the sum of single news as a control for attention and column two the sum of overall news. Columns
3 and 4 repeat these estimations with the market return correlation as the dependent variable. The coeffi-
cient of interest ω1 is positive and significant for all specifications on at least a 10% level with the lagged
Asian volatility as well as the number of fatalities in terrorist attacks as the instrument. Testing for weak
instruments39 shows that we can clearly reject the hypothesis of weak instruments in our estimation for the
specifications with the joint news40 as the variable of interest. The specification with shared news41 does
not allow for a clear rejection of the weak instrument hypothesis but shows qualitatively the same results.
We therefore find support for our proposition 1: An increase in news that cover more than a single
country results in higher comovement of market returns for these countries. The economic significance of
this effect is also not negligible with a one standard deviation increase of lagged shared news resulting in
an increase of the market return covariance of 1.1196 to 1.1213 standard deviations and an increase of the
correlation between 1.3265 and 1.3350 standard deviations42 using our first instrument. Using the second
instrument of fatalities in terrorist attacks we see an increase of lagged shared news resulting in an increase
of the market return covariance of 0.4124 to 0.4400 standard deviations and an increase between 0.8301 and
0.8367 standard deviations43 of the correlation. We conclude that this is an effect of economic significance.
The next step is to test proposition 2, i.e. in how far the conditions of information and asset markets
affect the existence of a contagion equilibrium which depends according to proposition 1 on investor pur-
chasing the joint signal. The higher importance of joint signals for countries might be the consequence
of either intermediate information cost, high information cost and intermediate excess returns or highly
volatile country specific fundamentals and signals. Therefore, we estimate the following equation to test the
hypothesis of our proposition 2:
Jointt,i = η0 + η1Cost
i
t + η2Return
i
t−1 + η3V ola
i
t−1 + Z
′δ + t,i (10)
where the dependent variable Joint is a measure of the importance of information frictions in either relative
or absolute terms for a given country i at time t. Our main variables of interest are proxies for cost of
information production, Costit, of the excess market return, Return
i
t−1, and of the fundamental volatility,
V olait−1.
Our proxies for cost of information production are the distance44 to London – the place where the FT is
edited – in km as well as the squared value of the distance. As was stated in proposition 2, if information
in the sample while joint news is the number of joint news that feature either of the two countries. We expect the measure of shared
news to be narrower but expect both specifications to qualitatively have the same result.
39The F-statistic of the first stage regressions are at least 44.4977 for the first instrument of lagged Asian volatility and at least
32.5272 for the second instrument of fatalities in terrorist attacks. Using the specification with lagged shared news as the main
variable the respective F-statistics are at least 14.7606 and 9.95362. Using the critical values for robust weak instrument tests
proposed by Olea and Pflueger (2013) we can reject the null hypothesis of the bias in the estimator being greater than 10 % of the
worst case bias on at least a 5 % level for the specification with joint news.
40See tables 5 and 6.
41See tables 10 and 7.
42A change of one standard deviation of joint news results in between a 0.7441 and 0.7454 standard deviations higher covariance
and between a 0.8833 and 0.8863 standard deviations higher correlation.
43A change of one standard deviation of joint news results in a between 0.2557 and 0.2755 standard deviations higher covariance
and between a 0.5185 and 0.5203 standard deviations higher correlation.
44The distance is between the most populated city in the UK i.e. London and the most populated city in the respective country.
Source: Mayer and Zignago (2011).
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Table 7: Proposition 1 - Terrorist fatalities (alternative)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Asset price covariance (level) Asset price correlation
Lagged Shared News 0.000325∗ 0.000305∗ 0.478∗∗ 0.482∗∗
(1.80) (1.69) (2.23) (2.18)
Attention (single news) 0.00000169∗∗∗ 0.000306
(8.98) (1.39)
Attention (overall news) 0.00000170∗∗∗ 0.0000789
(6.90) (0.26)
Trade flows 4.88e-14 4.10e-14 -3.00e-11 -3.41e-11
(1.49) (1.27) (-0.80) (-0.89)
Market valuation -1.75e-11∗∗∗ -2.05e-11∗∗∗ 6.89e-09 1.17e-08∗∗
(-5.13) (-5.67) (1.52) (2.38)
Mean Trade flows with Asia 5.74e-13∗∗∗ 5.57e-13∗∗∗ -5.49e-10∗∗ -6.16e-10∗∗∗
(3.17) (3.21) (-2.51) (-2.85)
Quadratic time trend 0.000361 0.000334 -0.585 -0.598
(0.72) (0.68) (-1.19) (-1.22)
3-Month interest rate -0.000230∗∗∗ -0.000247∗∗∗ -0.105 -0.102
(-3.20) (-3.51) (-1.46) (-1.42)
6-Month interest rate 0.000102∗ 0.000123∗∗ 0.0664 0.0626
(1.80) (2.20) (1.02) (0.95)
Constant 0.000430∗∗ 0.000250 0.265∗∗ 0.269∗
(2.57) (1.49) (1.98) (1.88)
Weekday dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6096 6096 6096 6096
1st stage F-statistics 9.95362 9.57518 9.95362 9.57518
Olea-Pflueger statistic 9.954 9.575 9.954 9.575
Robust t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
cost are too high, we expect investors not to inform themselves at all, while the case of the cost being too low
leads to investors preferring the more informative specific signals. Therefore, we estimate the relationship
between information cost and joint signals to be non-linear45. Additionally, we include a dummy for a coun-
try having English – being the language of the FT – as an official46 language. This controls for the potential
cost of translating reports or data published in other languages into English. We expect our measures of cost
of information production to positively, but non-linearly, affect the amount or share of joint news.
As a proxy for excess market return we use the lagged daily return of the stock market of the respective
country. Similar to the effect of cost of information on the importance of joint news we expect – given that
investors choose to inform themselves – a decrease in excess returns to result in more joint news. Again,
we also include the quadratic value and expect the relationship between the asset return and the importance
of joint news to be non-linear. Finally, we include the lagged volatility of the respective stock market and
expect the coefficient to be positive i.e. given that investors choose to inform themselves, the higher the
volatility of the fundamentals the larger should be on average the role of joint news for a given country in
line with condition 3.
Additionally, we control for inherent investor interest in a given country by including the lagged market
valuation as well as a dummy for a colonial history with the UK. The vector Z also collects a number of
further control variables. These are a quadratic time trend, a weekday indicator, the US interest rates and
45Another possible reason for the relationship to be non-linear is that costs do not increase linearly with increasing distance. This
would be captured by the quadratic term as well.
46This information was taken from the CIA factbook.
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yearly time dummies to control for any special effects of global events at a given time that might shift
attention e.g. sport tournaments like the Olympics. Additionally, we include the amount of overall news to
control for general attention paid to a country. We then estimate this equation for each of the eight countries
in our sample.
Table 8 shows the result of the estimation of equation (10). The first column was estimated using
the absolute number of joint news of a country as the dependent variable while column two estimates the
same with the joint news ratio as the dependent variable. Note that our sample and especially the second
estimation with the joint news ratio, which excludes any days without any news from the sample, as the
dependent variable implies that agents inform themselves about countries.
Table 8: Proposition 2
(1) (2)
Joint news (amount) Joint News (% overall)
Distance to London (km) 0.00199∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗
(3.53) (9.00)
Squared distance -9.70e-08∗∗∗ -0.00000686∗∗∗
(-3.58) (-8.84)
English (official) -0.253∗∗∗ -13.50∗∗∗
(-4.99) (-7.74)
Lagged asset return (%) -2.086∗∗ -33.01
(-2.49) (-1.57)
Squared lagged asset return 4.743 81.24
(1.17) (0.74)
Lagged Asset volatility 10.10∗∗∗ 74.14∗∗∗
(8.08) (2.61)
Lagged Market Value (million USD) -0.169 -21.57∗
(-0.35) (-1.70)
Colonial history -0.0864 -6.890∗∗∗
(-1.39) (-3.94)
Lagged Attention (overall news) 0.0191∗∗ -0.180
(2.16) (-1.00)
Quadratic time trend -0.170 -2.645
(-1.19) (-0.58)
3 months US interest rate 0.607∗∗∗ 15.79∗∗∗
(3.24) (2.93)
6 months US interest rate -0.670∗∗∗ -17.67∗∗∗
(-3.96) (-3.59)
Constant -8.980∗∗∗ -716.7∗∗∗
(-3.10) (-8.60)
Weekday dummies Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes
Observations 8239 6207
Adjusted R2 0.046 0.042
Robust t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Our results show that we find support for the three measures that can cause the grouping of signals
according to proposition 2. The first estimation shows that the estimated relationship between our proxy for
cost and the absolute number of joint news has an inverted U-shape. Both coefficients have the expected sign
and are significant on at least a 1 % level. This supports the condition 1 of proposition 2 that intermediate
cost of information result in more joint news. Additionally, we conclude from the results of the second
estimation that, given that agents inform themselves, higher costs result in a higher share of joint news.
Furthermore, we find negative and significant coefficients on at least a 1 % level for the English-dummy
which means that countries in our sample without English as an official language are more likely to appear
in joint news articles and have a lower share of more precise single news in their overall attention.
21
For our measure of excess returns we find an expected negative and significant coefficient on at least a
5 % level for the first estimation with the absolute number of joint news. This shows that given that agents
choose to acquire information, lower asset returns result in more joint signals being processed. Countries
with higher stock market returns are less likely to appear in joint news. We do not find a significant effect
of the lagged market return on the joint news ratio but observe the expected negative sign of the coefficient.
Furthermore, the coefficient of the quadratic asset return is insignificant, but has the expected positive sign.
Our third variable of interest, the lagged stock market volatility also shows the expected sign of the coef-
ficient and is significant on at least a 1 % level in both estimations. We see this as countries with a higher
volatility of the fundamentals being more likely to be covered in joint news in both absolute and relative
terms as predicted by our condition 3 of proposition 2.
Additionally, we find some support for a higher market valuation and a colonial history with the UK
negatively affecting joint news which we see as a control for more inherent investor interest in countries.
Countries that are of higher interest in general for investors have a higher share of more specific single news
or less absolute joint news and should therefore on average be less affected by information frictions based
contagion.
Altogether, we find that our proxies for cost of information, excess returns and volatility of fundamentals
support proposition 2. A higher, but not too high cost of information, lower excess returns and higher
volatility of fundamentals result in joint news being more important for a country and therefore, information
frictions to be of a higher relevance. This also helps explain why episodes of non-fundamental contagion are
less likely to affect more advanced economies, our corollary 1, that are generally seen as assets with higher
market returns, have a lower cost of information production and more stable fundamentals.
Therefore, we conclude that information friction induced crises of the kind described in this paper are
more relevant for emerging economies and less likely to affect more developed nations. The reason for
investors in less developed countries to group signals can be that these are of less inherent interest or that the
cost of information production in these countries is just higher, for instance, because data about economic
variables is not available or less reliable, reports or statements need to be translated or the distance is higher,
which results in higher costs for personal investigations.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we show theoretically as well as empirically that costly information plays a role for episodes
of contagion between countries. Furthermore, we point out the importance of taking the type of informa-
tion into account when dealing with investors that face costly information. We find that these information
frictions can lead to less precise signals, in the form of grouped information on several countries, which
can drive contagion. Such joint information leads to a steady excess comovement of asset prices between
the countries involved. Furthermore, these joint signals are likelier to be observed for emerging economies,
thereby making them especially vulnerable to contagion. This kind of contagion coexists among the more
classical types due to fundamental trade or financial links.
It is noteworthy that this does not happen due to agents behaving irrationally. Specific information about
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smaller, less developed economies is too expensive to produce or the expected risk-weighted returns are too
low, for them to be processed by rational agents. A clear policy implication would be for emerging markets
to provide better and cheaper information. However, since they are underdeveloped and less interesting for
investors, it may be that the loss from a sub-optimal action in an emerging market is so small, that it is not
worthwhile to obtain and process detailed information for these countries.
An additional issue we see, is that the empirical evidence is based on a sample from before the rise of
the internet as the most prominent medium to convey information. We specifically picked this time frame
for our study as the Asian crisis is a very common example of contagion in the literature, that is unlikely to
be caused mainly by fundamental channels. Furthermore, relying on daily newspaper articles as a measure
for processed information by investors is more reasonable to assume before the new information channels of
the internet emerged since the beginning of the new millennium. While we are confident that the mechanism
of contagion presented in this paper works regardless of the technological environment, it remains a task for
further research to test this mechanism of contagion based on information frictions with more recent means
of information transfers.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
We must find all conditions under which the joint signal is purchased in equilibrium. From proposition 1
it then follows that a contagion equilibrium exists if only if these conditions hold. We begin by finding
the equilibrium signal prices. Information suppliers make zero profits due to free entry. Otherwise, other
suppliers would enter, which would not be an equilibrium. From zero profits it follows that cj = χ/λj .
The equilibrium asset demands and prices are given by equations (5) and (6), which ensure the asset mar-
ket clears. What remain now are the signal demand and supply choices, which are equivalent in equilibrium.
Plugging in the optimal asset demands, utility becomes:
U = E[ 12ρ(µˆ− pr)′Σˆ−1(µˆ− pr)− cj ]
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Note that Σˆ =
[
σ2θM |Sj 0
0 σ2θR|Sj
]
Here σ2θi|Sj denotes the conditional variances. Let B denote the gross signal benefit before costs, i.e.
U = B − cj . Denote the gross benefit of purchasing the joint signal as B(SB), that of two specific signals
as B(SM , SR) and that of no signal as B0. Therefore, U(SM , SR) = B(SM , SR) − 2χ/λ, U(SB) =
B(SB)− χ/λ and for no information U = B0. Writing out the expectation yields:
B(SM , SR) =
1
2ρE[
(µˆθM−pr)2
σ2
θM |SM
+
(µˆθR−pr)2
σ2
θR|SR
]
B(SB) =
1
2ρE[
(µˆθM−pr)2
σ2
θM |SB
+
(µˆθR−pr)2
σ2
θR|SB
]
B0 = 12ρE[
(µθM−pr)2
σ2θM
+
(µθR−pr)2
σ2θR
]
Investors take prices as given and have rational expectations. Solving the expectations, we have:
B(SM , SR) =
1
2ρ [
σ2SM
(µθM−pr)2
σ2θM
(σ2SM
−σ2θM )
+
σ2θM
σ2SM
−σ2θM
+
σ2SR
(µθR−pr)2
σ2θR
(σ2SR
−σ2θR )
+
σ2θR
σ2SR
−σ2θR
]
B(SB) =
1
2ρ [
σ2SB
(µθM−pr)2
σ2θM
(σ2SB
−σ2θM )
+
σ2θM
σ2SB
−σ2θM
+
σ2SB
(µθR−pr)2
σ2θR
(σ2SB
−σ2θR )
+
σ2θR
σ2SB
−σ2θR
]
To compare the gross benefits, we subtract the benefit of the joint signal from the benefit of the country-
specific signals. We also subtract the benefit of no information from that of the joint signal. We define
∆B1 ≡ B(SM , SR)−B(SB) and ∆B2 ≡ B(SB)−B0. This yields:
∆B1 =
1
2ρ
[[
(µθM− pr)2+σ2θM
](
σ2SB
−σ2θSM
)
(σ2SM
−σ2θM )(σ
2
SB
−σ2θM )
+
[(
µθR− pr
)2
+σ2θR
](
σ2SB
−σ2θSR
)
(σ2SR
−σ2θR )(σ
2
SB
−σ2θR )
]
> 0
∆B2 =
1
2ρ
[ (µθM− pr)2+σ2θM
σ2SB
−σ2θM
+
(µθR− pr)2+σ2θR
σ2SB
−σ2θR
] > 0
Therefore, there exists a clear ranking of gross signal benefits B(SM , SR) > B(SB) > B0. With
symmetric information decisions, there are 8 potential combinations of signal supply and demand. Never-
theless, we can rule out three cases. Purchasing all three signals is not an equilibrium, as the joint signal has
a positive cost, but no added benefit if the two specific signals are observed. Purchasing one specific signal
and the joint signal is also not an equilibrium. Such a case has the same information cost as purchasing two
specific signals, but less benefit and is therefore strictly dominated.
We must also rule out that agents choose to only purchase one country-specific signal. Such a semi-
informative signal would have the same cost as the joint signal. If the gross benefit of the joint signal is
always smaller than that of the semi-informative signal, then it is never optimal to purchase the joint signal.
Due to the diagonality of the covariance matrix, we can split the gross benefits B(.) into the benefit when
purchasing assets of each country, denoted Bi. We have B(.) = BM (.) + BR(.). The semi-informed case
is dominated if:
BM (SB)−BM (SM ) +BR(SB)−B0R > 0 and BM (SB)−B0M +BR(SB)−BR(SR) > 0
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This condition boils down to: σ2SB < σ
2
Si
+ σ2i .
Furthermore, this implies 2B(SB) − B(SM , SR) − B0 > 0, which will be useful later on. Therefore,
only three cases can be optimal. Either the joint signal, two single signals or no information is purchased.
What remains is to find all conditions under which the joint signal is purchased in a symmetric equilibrium.
The information markets then clear with λB = λ, IB=1, λi = Ii = 0.
First consider different information prices for a given level of gross benefits. The ranking of the signal
prices is analogous to that of the gross benefits. Two specific signals cost more than a joint signal, which
costs more than no information. Furthermore, there is a clear ranking of utility for zero costs. Therefore, for
low costs, the specific signals are chosen. Similarly, for sufficiently high information prices, no information
can become optimal. It remains to be shown that it is possible for the joint signal to be optimal for an
intermediate level of costs. This requires that a case exists such that:
U(SB) > U(SM , SR) and U(SB) > B0
which holds under the aforementioned condition 2B(SB) − B(SM , SR) − B0 > 0. Hence, the joint
signal is purchased for intermediate levels of χλ , namely for
χ
λ ∈ (∆B1,∆B2).
Consider now different levels of benefits for given costs. The benefit differences are monotonically
increasing in the excess returns.
dB(SM ,SR)
d(µθi− pr)
> dBM (SB)d(µθi− pr)
> dB
0
d(µθi− pr)
> 0
For a given cost level, there are in general six possible utility rankings. Two rankings, namely, B0 >
U(SM , SR) > U(SB) and U(SM , SR) > B0 > U(SB) are impossible under the aforementioned condition
2B(SB)−B(SM , SR)−B0 > 0. We compare the remaining cases starting from µθi − pr = 0. However,
the analysis holds for any other initial point.
If initially we have the ranking U(SM , SR) > U(SB) > B0, then the two specific signals will remain
optimal for any higher levels of (µθi − pr). In such a case,the joint signal is never optimal for a given level
of costs. If initially we have one of the two rankings where SB is optimal, this must imply an intermediate
level of information costs. As we had already established that intermediate average information costs lead
to the joint signal becoming optimal, this is a redundant condition for the proposition.
This leaves one last possible initial ranking B0 > U(SM , SR) > U(SB). Such a case requires high
average information costs. As the excess returns increase, the joint signal will first become optimal and then
the two specific signals become optimal. The case that the joint signal is dominated by two specific signals
for intermediate levels of µθi − pr is again ruled out by 2B(SB) − B(SM , SR) − B0 > 0. Therefore, the
joint signal can also be optimal for high information prices and intermediate levels of excess returns. The
exact ranges can be found by solving for µθi − pr such that χ/λ−∆B1 > 0 and ∆B2 − χ/λ > 0.
The only remaining elements of the gross benefit functions not discussed are σ2SB , σ
2
θi
and σ2i . From
the lowest initial point of σ2SB , higher values are consistent with SB being optimal only if it is optimally
initially. Such a case would require intermediate average information prices and σ2SB < σ
2
Si
+ σ2i , which is
already covered. Similarly, if SB is initially optimal, a higher σ2i does not change this ranking.
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Furthermore, as σ2i or σ
2
θi
increase, the the benefit of the country specific signals approaches that of the
joint signal. Hence, if the joint signal is not dominated by no information, then the joint signal can become
optimal for sufficiently high σ2i or σ
2
θi
. To see this, note that from condition (3), σ2θi and σ
2
i are bounded
above by σ2SB > σ
2
θi
+ σ2i . We have:
lim
σ2θi
→σ2SB−σ
2
i
∆B1 = lim
σ2i→σ2SB−σ
2
θi
∆B1 = 0
lim
σ2θi
→σ2SB−σ
2
i
∆B2 > 0, lim
σ2i→σ2SB−σ
2
θi
∆B2 > 0
Empirical Appendix
Table 9 replicates the estimation of equation 7 presented in table 3 using the relative attention paid to Asia
with 2SLS and the amount of non-financial news in the Daily Mirror as an instrument. In this we follow
Mondria and Quintana-Domeque (2013). The results do not contradict our results presented in table 3.
Table 9: Estimation equation 7 - IV
Brazil Mexico Argentina Chile
Relative Attention
Single News Coefficient 0.0036738 0.0079507∗∗∗ 0.0036069∗ 0.0023656∗∗
(0.0030969) (0.0028024) (0.0021158) (0.0010196)
Overidentification 25.68∗∗
p-value 0.0119
Joint significance 5.61∗∗
p-value 0.0179
Observations 768 768 768 768
Joint News Coefficient -0.0025811 -0.0028396 -0.0002049 -0.0007559
(0.0021312) (0.0018328) (0.0012864) (0.0006272)
Overidentification 12.796
p-value 0.3840
Joint significance 1.74
p-value 0.1878
Observations 361 361 361 361
Overall News Coefficient -0.0036612 0.0087759 0.0050465 0.0015587
(0.0048723) (0.0056682) (0.0040096) (0.0015072)
Overidentification 20.131∗
p-value 0.0646
Joint significance 1.15
p-value 0.2830
Observations 770 770 770 770
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 10 shows the result of estimating equation 9 i.e. our proposition 1 with the alternative measure of
shared news as the variable of interest. The results are qualitatively in line with those in table 5 and therefore
shown here in the appendix.
Table 10: Proposition 1 - Asian volatility (alternative)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Asset price covariance (level) Asset price correlation
Lagged Shared News 0.000829∗∗∗ 0.000828∗∗∗ 0.769∗∗∗ 0.764∗∗∗
(3.21) (3.23) (3.46) (3.48)
Attention (single news) 0.00000131∗∗∗ 0.0000890
(4.51) (0.34)
Attention (overall news) 0.00000106∗∗∗ -0.000263
(2.92) (-0.82)
Trade flows -3.70e-14 -4.70e-14 -7.95e-11∗ -8.15e-11∗∗
(-0.78) (-1.01) (-1.94) (-2.04)
Market valuation -1.93e-11∗∗∗ -1.57e-11∗∗ 5.83e-09 1.42e-08∗∗
(-3.06) (-2.38) (0.94) (2.21)
Mean Trade flows with Asia 6.56e-13∗∗ 5.73e-13∗ -5.02e-10∗ -6.08e-10∗∗
(2.09) (1.86) (-1.68) (-2.08)
Quadratic time trend -0.00000274 -0.0000380 -0.794 -0.799
(-0.00) (-0.05) (-1.19) (-1.21)
3-Month interest rate -0.000266∗∗ -0.000273∗∗ -0.126 -0.117
(-2.48) (-2.53) (-1.28) (-1.19)
6-Month interest rate 0.000111 0.000119 0.0717 0.0607
(1.17) (1.24) (0.79) (0.67)
Constant 0.000476∗∗ 0.000378 0.292 0.337∗
(2.03) (1.59) (1.56) (1.78)
Weekday dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6096 6096 6096 6096
1st stage F-statistics 14.7606 15.0519 14.7606 15.0519
Olea-Pflueger statistic 14.761 15.052 14.761 15.052
Robust t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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